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Menger and Keynes agree in terms of stigmatizing the love of money. 
This paper attempts to demonstrate that the shared ethical judgment is 
defensible for both on the grounds of the same metaethical assumptions—
the value theory of Franz Brentano. The paper will be structured in two 
main parts: I. Ethics. The first part justifies the common rejection of the 
love of money, at the ethical level. This classical position, as a matter of fact, 
is considered controversial: in the case of Menger, his criticism towards 
egoism seems not coherent with his alleged utilitarianism; in the case of 
Keynes, his disparaging remarks on the love of money as a disgusting 
morbidity seem in direct contradiction with his endorsement of capitalism. 
II. Metaethics. In the second part, the focus will be the Fitting Attitude 
Theory of value, namely with reference to Brentano. The objective will be 
to identify and discuss the Brentanian arguments by which Menger and 
Keynes defend their ethical rejection of the love of money.
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INTRODUCTION
A Treatise on Money begins with the following statement: “Money of account, namely that in which debts and prices and general 
purchasing power are expressed, is the primary concept of a 
theory of money.”1 Obviously, Keynes does not underestimate the 
function of medium of exchange, and he adds: “Something which is 
merely used as a convenient medium of exchange on the spot may 
approach to being money, inasmuch as it may represent a means 
of holding general purchasing power.” Nevertheless, he believes, 
in a way that seems to be an implicit objection to Menger, that the 
function of medium of exchange is not sufficient to explain the true 
origin of money: “But if this is all, we have scarcely emerged from 
the stage of barter. Money proper in the full sense of the term can 
only exist in relation to a money of account.” (CWK, V, p. 3)
It is worth noting that, despite this clear disagreement, Streissler 
writes in 1973 “that in questions of monetary theory Menger 
anticipated most of Keynes’s ideas.” (Streissler 1973, p. 165) I agree 
with Streissler, and I think it is possible to demonstrate this accord 
at two different levels:
1)  At the ethical level, the love of money is judged by both of 
them to be incorrect because it is a conduct based on a false 
interpretation of the value of money; and
2)  At the metaethical level, Menger and Keynes make reference 
to the same theory of value—the fitting attitude theory of 
Brentano—with some relevant adjustment. This common 
reference allows them to justify their ethical positions.
1. ETHICS
1.1. Mengerian Utilitarianism?
The Aristotelian background, as argued by Smith (1990), 
permeates Austrian thought. This is particularly true for Menger, 
whose theory of value is inspired also by Nicomachean Ethics 
1  Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol. V, 3. Hereafter cited as CWK, with 
volume and page number.
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(Campagnolo, 2010). It should be easy to conclude, as Aristotle 
did, that pleonexia (greed) is a negative conduct. Nevertheless, it 
is not uncommon to find the thesis that the marginalist revolution 
is nothing but a version of the utility theory of value (Hunt and 
Lautzenheiser, 2011, p. 249), or the thesis that Menger, with Jevons 
and Walras, gave credit to the idea that “human behavior is exclu-
sively reducible to rational calculation aimed at the maximization 
of utility” (Screpanti and Zamagni, 2005, p. 166). Here is then the 
problem to be solved: the Mengerian rejection of the love of money 
is not compatible with his utilitarianist model, because hoarding 
money may in some situations be good and perfectly rational for 
the utility maximiser. 
My point is the following: Menger’s model is not utilitarianist. It 
is true that his emphasis on self-interest can be misinterpreted. It is 
also true that he is not prodigal of ethical evaluations on economics 
and, in particular, on the use of money. The reason is simple. 
He endorses a typically Weberian thesis: Economics should be 
conceived as a value-free science. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that Menger wrote: 
One of the strangest questions ever made the subject of scientific debate 
is whether rent and interest are justified from an ethical point of view or 
whether they are “immoral.” (Menger, 2007, p. 173)
Consequently, from this theoretical standpoint, economics 
examines money without any political orientation, regardless of 
normative standards:
It may well appear deplorable—Menger concludes—to a lover 
of mankind that possession of capital or a piece of land often 
provides the owner a higher income for a given period of time than 
the income received by a laborer for the most strenuous activity 
during the same period. Yet the cause of this is not immoral, 
but simply that the satisfaction of more important human needs 
depends upon the services of the given amount of capital or piece 
of land than upon the services of the laborer. (Menger, 2007, p. 174)
However, this methodological focus on self-interest does not 
necessarily involve the thesis that “human behavior is exclusively 
reducible to rational calculation.” On the contrary, Menger is 
well aware that, in reality, individuals never behave in a purely 
economic way—that is, following an ever-constant self-interest:
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For along with self-interest, which at most can be recognized as the main 
spring of human economy, also public spirit, love of one’s fellow men, 
custom, feeling for justice, and other similar factors determine man’s 
economic actions. (Menger, 1985, p. 84)
It is therefore crucial, for Menger, to grasp the difference 
between the task of economics, considered as a science, and the 
task of the practical sciences of national economy. The scientific 
task is to investigate self-interest in its purest form, “uninfluenced 
by other impulses or other considerations.” (Menger, 1985, p. 
87) The political task is to investigate and suggest what kind of 
monetary policy should be more suitable, under specific (historical 
and geographical) conditions of a country, and to prevent or, if 
necessary, fix possible disorders.
This is precisely the point that Schmoller, during the famous 
Methodenstreit, failed to appreciate. So, when he keeps on 
criticizing, stating that his opponent would be utilitarianist and a 
champion of the capitalist ideology of laissez-faire, Menger stands 
up for himself and justifies his political stance. In his pamphlet The 
Errors of the Historical School, published in 1884, he argues for the 
compatibility of his methodological option with his political and 
ethical commitment towards a fair economic model, which should 
be particularly in favor of the poor. (Menger, 1935a, p. 83)
Let us now turn to the Lectures to Crown Prince Rudolf of Austria.2 
I would argue that here Menger finally shows his ethical (Aristo-
telian) framework. “If and when the egoism and greed of a few 
become an obstacle to the interests of the many—Menger explains—
the time has come for the state to defend the equal rights of all.” 
(Streissler and Streissler, 1994, p. 125) There is a special feature that 
qualifies the selfish action—that is, it runs counter to the common 
good: it is the search for a momentary advantage. The example of 
2  In 1876, Menger was asked to teach the principles of political economy to Crown 
Prince Rudolf of Austria, whose notebooks have come to light. How can we be sure, 
therefore, that these lectures reflect Menger’s views? Obviously, this can never 
be fully proved. Streissler has examined a number of alternative explanations. I 
agree that the most plausible is the following: as far as we know, the notebooks 
were handed in to Menger for correction. So, we can conclude that, “apart from 
occasional naive remarks and a certain effusiveness, […] the notebooks reproduce 
faithfully what Menger said.” (Streissler and Streissler, 1994, p. 12)
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deforestation is highly telling exactly because the selfish action, in 
this case, aims precisely to make (and hoard) fast money: 
Quite often a forest owner in the mountains who is temporarily short 
of money will want to clear his high-lying forests; this can easily cause 
irreparable damage, since the rainfall will then run off in torrents and 
wash out the humus layer; floods in springtime, droughts in summer, 
and other kinds of damage to agriculture in the plains result from such 
deforestation of the mountain sides and tend to worsen over time. (Stre-
issler and Streissler, 1994, p. 127)
This aspiration to large gains of the moments worries also Keynes, 
who considers this short-termist style of business with opprobrium. 
(Keynes, 1963 [1923], p. 94) Menger’s judgment is as much trenchant: 
the blind greed of individuals may often “jeopardize the happiness 
of present and future generations.” (Streissler and Streissler, 1994, 
p. 127) So, government intervention is required to correct the selfish 
drift towards commodification, putting individual egoism “in its 
legally defined place” (Streissler and Streissler, 1994, p. 125), which 
is also its ethically defined place. This displacement, from blind 
greed to normal egoism, is partly utopic: Menger is well aware 
that the ethical requirement to “make any sacrifice for the common 
good” “is an ideal every country must strive for” (Streissler and 
Streissler, 1994, p. 133). But precisely that ideal of a “good life” for 
everyone proves, in typical Aristotelian fashion, that Menger has 
committed himself on a level which is not strictly economic but 
evaluative–normative. I agree, then, with Boettke, who says that 
Austrian economics can be rightly described “as humanitarian in its 
concerns.” (Boettke, 2010, p. 164) My point is that Keynes, too, does 
not argue in a different way.
1.2. Perversion of Desire
The love of money is, for Keynes, the primary ethical question: 
“At any rate to me it seems clearer every day that the moral 
problem of our age is concerned with the love of money, with the 
habitual appeal to the money motive in nine-tenths of the activities 
of life.” (CWK, IX, p. 269) What is at stake here is a perversion 
of desire, which is typical of capitalism. Obviously, money can 
be well loved “as a means to the enjoyments and realities of life.” 
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But if it is loved “as a possession”—that is, when money becomes 
“the object of true religion” (CWK, II, p. 12)—the love that this 
specific object engenders must be recognized for what it is: “a 
somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-
pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to 
the specialists in mental disease.” (CWK, IX, p. 329)
Keynes clearly refers to Freud (Dostaler and Maris, 2000). 
But I believe that the argument which justifies his diagnosis of 
perversion is linked to an Aristotelian background. The craziness 
arises when one starts to use money as a store of wealth. If we 
accept that money is a mere intermediary, then hoarding money 
becomes automatically an insane use. Keynes affirms it clearly: 
“Why should anyone outside a lunatic asylum wish to use money 
as a store of wealth?” (Keynes, 1937, p. 216) 
But this is the problem with Keynes: the world we live in is not 
the world of the classical economy. We live in a monetary world 
of production, in which money—also considered as a store of 
wealth—plays a significant role. From this point of view, the case of 
“liquidity preference” is paradigmatic: in a context of uncertainty, 
Keynes admits that holding money seems a perfectly rational 
choice, because it “lulls our disquietude.” (Keynes, 1937, p. 216)
Apparently, Keynes is in contradiction with himself: the love of 
money (however morally and psychologically repugnant it may 
be) is absolutely normal and indispensable, at any rate when the 
future is dark. As a consequence, Keynes’s ethics seem directly in 
conflict with his monetary theory. 
I argue, on the contrary, that the critical remark on money-
motive is logically related with the idea that money’s ability to 
act as a store of wealth amounts—for Keynes—to a malfunction 
of the economic system. The liquidity preference, therefore, is not 
rejected by Keynes on the basis of an imaginary anti-capitalist 
utopia, but because it can make the capitalist system a) inefficient 
and b) unjust, at the same time:
a)  Inefficient, because the propensity to hoard causes the 
“enormous anomaly of unemployment”: as Keynes stated, 
…unemployment develops, that is to say, because people want the 
moon;—men cannot be employed when the object of desire (i.e., money) 
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is something which cannot be produced and the demand for which 
cannot be readily chocked off. (CWK, VII, p. 235)
b)  Unjust, because the money-motive causes an “arbitrary and 
inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes.” (CWK, VII, 
p. 372)
Surely, the liquidity preference can be comprehended, but it 
is not the best way to manage the capitalist system. In the long 
run, the fact of holding liquid reserves can determine a crisis of 
confidence in the system of economic intermediations: “Our desire 
to hold money as a store of wealth is a barometer of the degree of 
our distrust of our own calculations and conventions concerning 
the future.” (Keynes 1937, p. 116) The consequence of this crisis is, 
for Keynes, catastrophic: the normal strategic interaction between 
economizing agents turns into “egotistic atomism,” a concept 
which Keynes employs for defining modern capitalism as “a mere 
congeries of possessors and pursuers.” (CWK, IX, p. 267) 
There is however a difference here between Menger and 
Keynes. Keynes seems nearly “dogmatic” in taking egotistic 
behavior to be necessarily related to capitalism. Menger—as we 
have seen—is subtler: self-interest, obviously, is “the mainspring 
of human economy,” but there is also the “public spirit.” It is not 
then “automatic”—as for Keynes—that self-interest degenerates 
into selfishness.
Certainly, and here Menger and Keynes share the same concern, 
capitalism needs to be “wisely managed.” 
In the case of Keynes, what has to be noticed is that his “Aristo-
telian” evaluation is strongly associated with his monetary theory: 
if “our gods” become “avarice and usury,” then “fair is foul and 
foul is fair, for foul is useful and fair is not.” (CWK, IX, p. 331)
The reference to “usury” is crucial in order to understand the 
function of ethics in Keynes’s economic thought. In the General 
Theory, and elsewhere, Keynes argues the equivalence of his 
liquidity preference theory with the medieval and classical (Aristo-
telian) definition of usury. But what is important is this: the critical 
evaluation of this repugnant practice is not immediately justified 
on the basis of ethical reasons. As for Aristotle, usury is first of all 
a monetary anomaly. It is then because of this economic reason 
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that usury may be ethically questionable. This excerpt of Politics 
(1285b) shows the same line of argument endorsed by Keynes:
Usury—Aristotle explains—is very justifiably detested, since it gets 
wealth from money itself, rather than from the very thing money was 
devised to facilitate. For money was introduced to facilitate exchange, 
but interest makes money itself grow bigger. (That is how it gets its 
name; for offspring resemble their parents, and interest is money that 
comes from money). Hence of all the kinds of wealth acquisition this one 
is the most unnatural.
When this unnatural kind of wealth acquisition becomes a 
system of production, everything can be transformed in a possible 
means of maximizing utility:
We destroy the beauty of the countryside because the unappropriated 
splendors of nature have no economic value. We are capable of shutting 
off the sun and the stars because they do not pay a dividend. (CWK, XXI, 
p. 242)
It is the same as Menger’s diagnosis of commodification. Under 
these pathological conditions, the therapy against the disgusting 
morbidity of the love of money is simply said: Keynes invites us “to 
return to some of the most sure and certain principles of religion 
and traditional virtue—that avarice is a vice, that the exaction of 
usury is a misdemeanour, and the love of money is detestable.” 
(CWK, IX, p. 331)
There is an indicator which, for Keynes, attests that we are 
anew on “the paths of sane wisdom”: We shall be able to “prefer 
the good to the useful” (CWK, IX, p. 331). That does not mean, in 
my view, that the pursuit of the useful is, for Keynes, necessarily 
detestable. As for Menger, the useful has the value of means; 
therefore, the criterion which regulates the useful cannot again 
be the useful. The means, in the world of the classical economy to 
which Keynes refers, is regulated by the end, and the end is the 
good which, for Keynes, too, always involves a nexus between 
the individual and the common interest. That is what Keynes, 
I think, intends to say when he affirms that “fair is not useful”; 
fair is the intersubjective measure which makes appropriate and 
legitimate the pursuit of the useful. If the useful becomes its own 
measure, then “foul is fair.”
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This is the same line of argument on which Nicomachean Ethics 
is grounded. But the thesis according to which money—and the 
useful in general—is a means is justifiable for both Menger and 
Keynes on the basis of the same theory of value. We have now to 
make explicit this metaethical level.
2. METAETHICS
2.1. Fitting Attitude Account of Value 
Lachmann (1977) has argued that the importance of the Austrian 
school of economics is essentially the subjective revolution. This 
applies, in particular, to the case of Menger, where the theory of 
value is subject-dependent. “Essentially the same thing may be 
said,” according to Chisholm (2010, p. 145), of the theory of value 
as Brentano conceived it.3 As regards Keynes, his philosophical 
engagement with Moore and Brentano is well known (Baldwin, 
2006). Let us then begin to define this common metaethical model.
The key idea of the Brentanian model is the distinction between 
“intrinsic good” and “instrumental good”: “We must distinguish 
between primary and secondary goods—between what is good in 
itself and what is good for something else.” (Brentano, 2009b, p. 11) 
We can provide an account of this difference in the following way: 
a)  What is an intrinsic good is good for its own sake neces-
sarily—that is, in every possible world in which it happens. 
As a consequence, a good in itself, Brentano explains, “can 
stand side by side with the true. For whatever is true, is true 
in itself.” (Brentano, 2009b, p. 11)
b)  What is instrumentally good, or good as a means, is something 
that happens to lead to a good result in this world—that is, 
it varies according to time, place and circumstances; what is 
instrumentally good on one occasion may be instrumentally 
neutral, or instrumentally bad, on another occasion. 
The intrinsic/instrumental distinction allows us to put the 
typical economic goods in the right place: “the useful—the same 
3  I do not discuss here whether or not Menger has truly read Brentano. I am 
interested in proving the equivalence of their respective metaethical assumptions.
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Brentano explains—is a clear example of the latter type of good.” 
(Brentano, 2009b, p. 11) Money is then an instrumental good; that 
is to say, that it cannot be correctly loved for its own sake.
The next step is the definition of the predicate “good,” which 
is strictly conceived as intrinsic good. Grounded in the analogy 
good—true, Brentano formulates his fitting attitude theory of value: 
We call a thing true when the affirmation relating to it is correct. We call 
a thing good when the love relating to it is correct. In the broadest sense 
of the term, the good is that which is worthy of love, that which can be 
loved with a love that is correct. (Brentano, 2009b, p. 11) 
We can outline the following definition: 
A is intrinsically good =def A is necessarily such that, for any 
x who contemplates A, A is a “fitting object of a pro-attitude.” 
(Ewing, 1948, p. 152)
The emotivist hypothesis has to be rejected immediately. The good 
is inferred from correct emotions—that is, in a sense true. But here, 
there is ample room for justified skepticism. The more questionable 
point is the meaning of “worthy”. It would seem reasonable, based 
on the Brentanian definition of good, to exclude that “worthy” 
depends on a real predicative determination of a thing. From here, 
the problem emerges: What does it mean that an object is “worthy 
of love” if the object does not possess properties such as to cause the 
pro-attitude? What does “correctness” of an emotion mean?
The fitting attitude theory of value cannot aspire to be a corre-
spondentist theory in the classical sense of “adequatio rei et intel-
lectus.” Brentano states it clearly: “It would be manifestly absurd 
to say that the correctness of love and hate consists in a kind of 
identity that holds between these feelings […] and something 
lying outside the feelings.” (Brentano, 2009b, p. 48) However, 
Brentano is decidedly much less clear when he attempts to explain 
how this kind of correspondence should be conceived: “One loves 
or hates correctly provided that one’s feelings are adequate to their 
object—adequate in the sense of being appropriate, suitable, or 
fitting.” (Brentano, 2009b, p. 48) 
Maybe an example could provide a clue to understanding. 
Brentano endorses Aristotle: “When we contemplate knowledge, 
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there arises out of this contemplation a correct love of knowledge.” 
(Brentano, 2009b, p. 99) Similarly, it is correct to become indignant 
about injustice, because we have an immediate awareness that 
injustice is worthy of disgust. This means that, following Brentano, 
some of our emotional reactions are similar to the apodictic judgment. 
An axiom, for example, is a proposition which requires, as the 
correct epistemic reply, to be accepted as immediately true. The 
same happens for certain emotional answers which are recognized 
as correct (richtige anerkannte). Furthermore, the ability to detect 
this correctness emotively is, Brentano believes, “common to all 
the members of our species.” (Brentano, 2009b, p. 13) This binding 
assumption, as we will see, is shared by both Menger and Keynes.
I think it is possible to conclude this point by saying that the 
pro-attitude is not dependent on congruence with an outside 
object, but it is not even a simple matter of taste. Rather, the corre-
spondence has to be intended between a given attitude and its 
“self-givenness” (Selbstgegebenheit). This means that, for Brentano, 
correct love or hate stems from an inner experience of evidence—an 
immediate perception (Wahrnehmung) of their truth. In a letter 
to Oskar Kraus, Brentano writes: “We know with immediate 
evidence that certain of our emotive attitudes are correct.” (quoted 
in Chisholm, 1982, p. 72) 
It is not my intention to discuss here the consistency of this meta-
ethical model. My aim is to prove that Menger and Keynes opt, 
within limits, for it. I shall simply note, in accord with Reicher, that 
the immediate access to values through evidence is dubious: “If 
evidence is merely a feeling of certainty, clarity and distinctness, 
then it does not guarantee truth.” (Reicher, 2009, p. 113) To sum up: 
A feeling of clarity is not a sufficient criterion which allows us to 
distinguish between real evidence and apparent evidence. 
It has to be said that Brentano himself sees the problem: “There 
is no guarantee that every good thing will arouse in us an emotion 
that is experienced as being correct. When this does not occur, 
our criterion fails.” But he is, nonetheless, convinced that “there 
are many things, and not just a single thing that we recognize in 
this manner to be good.” (Brentano, 2009b, p. 15) So, having once 
acquired the conviction that we possess certain insightful feelings, 
immediately perceived as correct, Brentano can explain how 
some of our other feelings are, on the contrary, ethically wrong. 
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The argument is simple: If correct love is similar to the apodictic 
judgment, incorrect love is similar to prejudice. The example 
concerns exactly the love of money: “The feelings of inclination 
and disinclination often resemble blind judgment in being only 
instinctive or habitual. This is so in the case of the pleasure the 
miser takes in hoarding money.” (Brentano, 2009b, p. 12)
What, then, has to be considered ethically wrong in avarice? 
First, hoarding money is “a foolish passion” (Brentano, 2009a, 
p. 18)—that is, it lacks the typical sort of clarity that is supposed 
to qualify correct emotions. Second, the lack of clarity involves 
a misinterpretation of the value of money: “Who loves money, 
completely forgets the aim and acquires a senseless desire for the 
means, just as if they were the end” (Brentano, 2009a, p. 18).
Therefore, we can conclude by saying that avarice is a type of love 
which is not in harmony (im Einklange) with the value of money; or 
the same thing—money is not worthy of love for its own sake; it is 
not a fitting object of a pro-attitude, being only instrumentally good. 
2.2. Menger’s Theory of Value 
It seems that Menger completely endorses the Brentanian 
thesis, according to which value is not a property of things, but it 
is subject-dependent: “The goods-character is nothing inherent 
in goods and not a property of goods, but merely a relationship 
between certain things and men, the things obviously ceasing to 
be goods with the disappearance of this relationship” (Menger, 
2007 [1871], p. 52). Obviously, we have to bear in mind that 
the value in question here is related to economic goods—that 
is, the typical instrumental goods, following the metaethical 
classification proposed by Brentano. For Menger, this means 
that a thing acquires goods-character when it is placed in a 
causal connection with the satisfaction of our needs. Therefore, 
knowledge of goods-character is a posteriori and contingent, 
because the causal nexus varies according to time, place and 
circumstances. To be more precise, if a thing is to become an 
economic good, all four of the following prerequisites must be 
simultaneously present: 
1.  A human need (Bedürfnis). 
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2.  Such properties as render the thing capable of being brought 
into a causal connection with the satisfaction of this need. 
3.  Human knowledge of this causal connection. 
4.  Command of the thing sufficient to direct it to the satisfaction 
of the need. (Menger, 2007 [1871], p. 52)
I would argue that the first prerequisite can be considered 
Brentanian. I ground my interpretation in the second edition of 
Principles of Economics (published posthumously in 1923), in 
which Menger writes no more simply “a human need” but “the 
perception of a human need” (see Becchio, 2014). It is true that 
Menger never speaks of “fitting attitude” or “correct emotion.” 
Besides, what is at stake here are instrumental goods. It is also 
true that Brentano never speaks of “human need.” Despite the 
differences, I believe that there is a point of agreement. Menger 
considers needs as always being in connection with desires: A 
need appears as involving a request of satisfaction and, therefore, 
as strictly related to desires and interests. This point can also be 
found in the Brentanian model, and I would argue that it is not a 
mere coincidence. As Smith (1994) and Shionoya (2012) showed, 
it seems reasonable to infer that Mengerian subjectivism has been 
directly influenced by Brentano’s psychology. Brentano, in fact, 
stresses three classes of mental phenomena: 
a)  ideas or presentation; 
b)  judgments (affirmations and negations);
c)  emotions. 
Presentation, which we acquire through perception or imagi-
nation, does not mean “that which is presented” but rather the act 
of presentation. This act is the basic part of the mind: Every mental 
act (judgment or emotion) is superimposed on presentation. 
Every judgment is either true or false: It is true when its affir-
mation is correct; as a consequence, when something is affirmed 
as correct, it is implied that it is false (incorrect) to deny that which 
was affirmed. 
Finally, the third class includes love and hate but also interests, 
desires, acts of will and choices. 
Now, then, the Mengerian “perception of a human need” can be 
classified, I believe, as being on the first level: It is a self-presenting 
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state through which we know a need and its correlative desire for 
satisfaction. Therefore, the goods-character of a thing, for Menger 
himself, is related to an emotion (need-desire) which is based on a 
self-presenting perception. To put it more precisely: human needs 
and desires are the basic standard of the evaluation of economic 
goods. This is why Menger stated that the nature of the economic 
value is subjective.
It is actually not very different from Aristotle. Or, at least, this is 
the “subjectivist interpretation” of Book V of Nicomachean Ethics, 
which Menger knows well (Menger, 2007 [1871], pp. 277, 295). 
Here, Aristotle argues that there can be no exchange if goods were 
not measured by some standard. “This standard is in fact demand 
(chreia), which holds everything together; for if people needed 
nothing, or needed things on different degrees, either there would 
be no exchange or it would not be the same as it now is” (Aristotle, 
2004 [c. 350 BC], p. 90). 
So far, then, Menger is Brentanian because of his Aristotelian 
background. The other prerequisites, namely the second and the 
third, are clearly beyond the Brentanian framework.
With the second prerequisite, we understand that the goods-
character of a thing also depends on the intrinsic properties of that 
thing. The goods-character is not obviously reducible to something 
inherent in goods; but not everything is capable of being brought 
into a causal connection with the satisfaction of our human needs.
At the metaethical level, Menger seems not to be content with the 
Brentanian criterion of evidence: The self-presenting perception 
does not function as an inner experience of clarity, which would 
thus guarantee itself and the emotion which is presented. Rather, I 
think that Menger tends to combine Brentano’s subjectivism with 
a classical (correspondentist) theory of truth. In fact, with the third 
prerequisite, Menger states that value, which remains dependent 
on desire, requires “a judgment economizing men make about 
the importance of the goods at their disposal for the maintenance 
of their lives and well-being” (Menger 2007 [1871], p. 121). The 
Mengerian theory of value intends to be subjective and objective at 
the same time. I agree with Zúñiga (1998, p. 164), who defends this 
double character as follows: “The judgment that the agent makes 
regarding the economic object is subjective but its truth or falsity 
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can be settled objectively by the correspondence of the judgment 
with facts in the world.”
I would also add that the subjective judgment is not a product 
of arbitrariness because the relation of correspondence is between 
the real properties of the thing desired and real needs and desires. 
Menger believes that it is possible to identify the “true constitution 
of things” (Menger, 2007 [1871], p. 53) and the “true human 
needs”4 by separating them from their false counterparts. This 
distinction, which is borrowed from Aristotle, is easy to set: When 
properties are “erroneously ascribed to things that do not really 
possess them” or when “non-existent human needs are mistakenly 
assumed to exist,” we enter in the irrational domain of “imaginary 
goods” and “imaginary needs” (Menger, 2007 [1871], p. 53).
Menger, then, is more Aristotelian than Brentano because of his 
reference to the true constitution (i.e. essence) of things and the 
reference to “the naturality of the needs.”
What is problematic, in my opinion, is how to justify the 
imaginary/true distinction within a metaethical framework which 
is not purely objectivist. It is unquestionable, as stated above, 
whether Menger advocates for a correspondentist model of truth; 
but its reference to “human nature” and the “essence of things” 
is only apparently Aristotelian because it is consciously detached 
from any metaphysical background (see Crespo, 2003).5 Menger’s 
position on metaethics actually swings between objectivism and 
subjectivism.
On the one hand, Menger would claim to establish the “exact 
types” of the fundamental human needs. At that point, he would 
come to classify the imaginary needs as “incorrect” tokens; on the 
other hand, he is forced to admit that there is no objective measure 
of needs and “true” values (Menger, 2007 [1871], pp. 146, 299) since 
we always have to deal with the (subject-dependent) perception of 
needs and with the (subject-dependent) use value of goods.
Because of this oscillation, Menger is vulnerable to criticism from 
a purely subjectivist standpoint. Mises (2003 [1933], p. 185), for 
4  The expression “wahre Bedürfnisse” is actually in the second edition of Principles 
of Economics (see Shionoya, 2012, p. 75).
5  We will see that this is a problem which Keynes also had to face.
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example, views the first case (imaginary goods) as obviously incon-
sistent: It is highly possible that things that are “objectively” useless 
become subjectively goods in the economic sense of the world. 
The second case (imaginary needs) is even more problematic: Who 
can decide whether a certain human need is mistakenly assumed 
to exist? But Mises’s criticism is even more radical. Menger may 
condemn “certain modes of behavior as absurd and opposed to 
‘real’ needs.” The question, however, is that “such judgments—for 
Mises—are beside the point for a science dealing with the reality 
of human action. Not what a man should do, but what he does, 
counts for praxeology and economic. (Mises, 1998 [1949], p. 96)
But the issue, with regard to Menger, is that he is neither a pure 
objectivist nor a pure subjectivist. The attribution of value is not 
a matter of pure choice; it is also a matter of judgment. Menger 
states it clearly, with reference to Aristotle: If the attribution of 
value derives from a process involving rational deliberation, then 
we are in the field of true needs and goods; if the process is, for 
some reason, irrational—that is, if it involves the false ascription of 
properties to things that do not really possess them, we are in the 
field of imaginary needs and goods. Markets provide incentives 
to generate such goods. I then agree with Caldwell, who states 
that “sellers of snake oil are constantly with us, and some people 
are taken in” (Caldwell, 2006, p. 381). But this process is open to 
critical examination. As a consequence, we can learn and rectify 
this kind of mistake.
This is why I am inclined to think that the imaginary/true 
distinction is anything but arbitrary. In particular, I believe, 
contrary to the claims of Mises, that the distinction is a valid 
criterion that can be used to detect and correct the process of 
assigning an imaginary value to money. Let us see why.
According to Mengerian metaethical laws, we said that being 
good is not a property of a thing but a relationship between a 
thing and a need; it depends on a judgment regarding a thing’s 
actual ability to satisfy real needs. The case of money is no 
different: As we know, money has a goods-character because it 
is a thing which is supposed to have a certain degree of market-
ability—that is, a non-inherent property to facilitate the exchange 
of economic goods.
77Paolo Gomarasca: Fitting Attitude Theory in Economics: Menger and Keynes
What happens, then, when one loves money for its own sake? The 
money lover assigns to money the supposed inherent property of 
being good in itself. This is the first metaethical mistake. The attri-
bution of this imaginary value involves the false perception of an 
imaginary need—the urge of accumulation. This is the second meta-
ethical mistake. The need to hoard money is not real, because it does 
not arise from rational deliberation on the real nature of money and 
from a correct assessment of human nature; it follows from a process 
of fetishization. This is why, for Menger too, money is not worthy of 
love; this is as a consequence of his metaethical assumptions.
2.3. Keynes’s Theory of Value
As it has been demonstrated, Keynes knows and admires Bren-
tano’s work (Bateman, Davis, 1991; Baldwin, 2006). I am interested 
in highlighting a theoretical agreement, which I consider relevant 
to proving my thesis. In a famous, unpublished paper (Miscellanea 
Ethica, 1905), Keynes endorses a metaethical view, which is close 
to the fitting attitude theory of value endorsed by Brentano: “An 
object, towards which a valuable mental relation is possible, is 
liable to receive the same epithet as the mental relation it inspires. 
[…] Anything which is fit to inspire a good feeling is itself regarded 
as good.” (Quoted in Davis, 1994, p. 78)
As we already observed, the attribution of goods-character is 
justifiable on the basis of an inner experience of a pro-attitude 
which is immediately perceived as correct. For Keynes too, this 
state of mind, which is related to a fit object, has an intrinsic value. 
This means that, always in harmony with the Brentanian meta-
ethical framework, Keynes, as well as Menger, grounds his line 
of argument in the intrinsic/instrumental distinction. Only the 
things that possess an intrinsic value may be ethically justifiable 
as ends; on the contrary, the things that have only an instrumental 
value count as means in relation to the ends.
However, Keynes, again in a similar way to Menger, is not purely 
Brentanian. In my opinion, there are two points of difference with 
the Brentanian model:
1)  The attempt to combine the subjective attribution of goods-
character with a certain objective standard of evaluation.
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2)  The thesis that some states of affairs may have intrinsic value 
apart from experience.
1) The pursuit of an objective standard of evaluation leads Keynes 
towards the reference to the (problematic) normative function of 
human nature: “Assuming the approximate uniformity of human 
organs, we can often—if not near enough—say what, apart from 
peculiar circumstances, a man ought to think and feel” (quoted in 
Davis, 1994, pp. 80–81). Obviously, this reference is not intended 
to be perfectly Aristotelian. Keynes is well aware that his position 
“lacks the precision which a metaphysician would desire.” In my 
opinion, it is more understandable in Humean terms. It is known 
that Hume argues for the universality of human nature exactly on 
the grounds of a certain “similarity” between the minds of all men: 
The minds of all men—writes Hume—are similar in their feelings and 
operations; nor can any one be actuated by any affection, of which all 
others are not, in some degree, susceptible. As in strings equally wound 
up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections 
readily pass from one person to another, and beget correspondent 
movements in every human creature. (Hume, 2000 [1739-1740], nn. 
575–576)
I consider the Keynesian claim for the “approximate uniformity 
of human organs” to be along the same line of argument. Surely, 
this reference to a certain regularity in human thinking and feeling 
does not lead to an objectivist position. But I consider it sufficient, 
as in the case of Hume, to reject a thoroughly relativist subjectivism. 
2) This is why Keynes is convinced that not only states of mind 
but also some states of affairs may have intrinsic value. Beauty, 
harmony, justice and virtue are, according to Keynes, some 
examples of intrinsically valuable states of affairs. This is the 
second difference from the Brentanian model. Following Brentano, 
the intrinsic value of a state of affairs is always dependent on 
the emotions which are appropriate to, or required by, that state 
of affairs. For Keynes, some states of affairs can be judged based 
on their intrinsic value—that is, Carabelli suggests, totally apart 
from their influences on experience. In another early paper (On 
the Principle of Organic Unity, 1910), Keynes states clearly this anti-
consequentialist position: 
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We ought to aim at bringing into existence a good state of affairs, and we 
should not judge rightly if our approval and disapproval has reference 
to isolated consciousness only [...]. Intrinsic value is ethical. Some states 
of affairs ought to exist rather than others apart from their influence or 
experience. (Quoted in Carabelli, 1998, p. 198)
Let us now ask: How can we classify the love of money in 
reference to these metaethical assumptions?
The first point to remember is that money—and the market in 
general—belongs to the domain of instrumental goods. Keynes 
admits that he borrowed the distinction from Marx. As rightly 
pointed out by Meikle (2001, p. 41), Keynes might also have got it 
from Aristotle, whom he read, and who first made the distinction in 
Politics Book One (Aristotle, 1998 [350 BC]). Besides, Marx himself 
took it from Aristotle and made it the cornerstone of his analysis of 
the market economy. As a consequence, the love of money for its 
own sake is not a good feeling, because money is not a fitting object 
of such love. An instrumental good is fit to inspire appreciation, but 
the correct appreciation of an instrumentally good object is not for its 
own sake but for the sake of the intrinsic good it helps to realize. The 
love of money is not, then, a valuable mental relation (it is foolish, 
strictly speaking), because it is grounded in a misinterpretation: A 
means, belonging to the category of useful, becomes an end—that 
is, it is mistakenly treated as an intrinsic good.
The second questionable point is that the love of money 
engenders an unfair social order which is directly in conflict with a 
state of affairs which Keynes considers intrinsically good and, for 
that reason, ethically required.
Therefore, Keynes justifies his ethical refusal of the love of money, 
starting from the same metaethical premises endorsed by Menger. 
CONCLUSION
To sum up, Menger and Keynes can be considered in light of two 
significant points of agreement:
1) At the ethical level, I have tried to demonstrate that, for 
both Menger and Keynes, the line of argument is the same: The 
useful, which is not per se morally problematic, becomes ethically 
stigmatizable when it tends to occupy the entire horizon of human 
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desires. Actually, the useful—as, for example, money—has value 
as means; therefore, the ethical criterion which regulates the useful 
cannot again be the useful. The means, in the world of the classical 
(Aristotelian) economy to which Menger and Keynes refer, is 
regulated by the end, and the end is the common good. This is why 
the love of money, which is a clear symptom of egoism, is ethically 
and politically detestable.
2) At the metathical level, I have argued that, for both Menger 
and Keynes, the love of money is unjustifiable with reference to 
a common metaethical assumption, the fitting attitude theory 
of value conceived by Brentano, combined with an objective 
standard, which balances the subjectivist background of the Bren-
tanian model.
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